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The major purpose of the present study is to examine how the institutional quality 
impact on the offer size of initial public offering (IPO) listed on the Main Board of 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange during the year 2000 to 2017. This study utilizes three 
control variables for controlling the significance between institutional quality and 
offer size. Few empirical pieces of evidence measure the relationship between 
institutional quality and offer size. Therefore, this study fills the gap of literature on 
the significance of institutional quality on the offer size. There are six dimensions of 
institutional quality utilized from World Governance Indicators (WGI) that including 
government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption, political stability, voice 
and accountability and regulatory quality. The agency theory and signaling theory 
are used to further explain the impacts of institutional quality on the offer size. The 
present study utilizes the cross-sectional multi regression analysis to examine the 
hypothesis. Based on the analysis of the data of 1042 IPOs in Hong Kong, the result 
of this study shows that government effectiveness and regulatory quality negatively 
impact the offer size, and rule of law, control of corruption, political stability and 
voice and accountability positively impact on the offer size. Besides, the interest rate 
and the stock market return reflect a positive significance with offer size, but the 
Gross Domestic Price (GDP) growth shows a negative relationship with offer size. 
The significance of the present study may remind the regulators to improve the 
institutional quality to promote the growth of the market.  
 
 







Tujuan utama kajian ini adalah untuk mengkaji bagaimana impak kualiti institusi ke 
atas tawaran tawaran tawaran awam awal (TAA) yang disenaraikan di Papan Utama 
Bursa Saham Hong Kong pada tahun 2000 hingga 2017. Kajian ini menggunakan 
tiga pemboleh ubah kawalan untuk mengawal kepentingan antara kualiti institusi dan 
saiz tawaran. Beberapa bukti empirikal mengukur hubungan antara kualiti institusi 
dan saiz tawaran. Oleh itu, kajian ini mengisi jurang kesusasteraan mengenai 
kepentingan kualiti institusi pada saiz tawaran. Terdapat enam dimensi kualiti 
institusi yang digunakan daripada Petunjuk Tata Pemerintahan Dunia (WGI) yang 
termasuk keberkesanan kerajaan, kedaulatan undang-undang, kawalan korupsi, 
kestabilan politik, suara dan kebertanggungjawaban dan kualiti pengawalseliaan. 
Teori agensi dan teori isyarat digunakan untuk menerangkan lebih lanjut mengenai 
kesan kualiti institusi pada saiz tawaran. Kajian ini menggunakan analisis regresi 
pelbagai rentas untuk mengkaji hipotesis. Berdasarkan analisa data 1042 TAA di 
Hong Kong, hasil kajian ini menunjukkan bahwa keberkesanan dan kualitas 
pengawasan pemerintah berdampak negatif terhadap ukuran tawaran, aturan hukum, 
pengendalian korupsi, kestabilan politik dan suara dan akuntabilitas memberi 
dampak positif pada saiz tawaran. Di samping itu, kadar faedah dan pulangan 
pasaran saham mencerminkan kepentingan positif dengan saiz tawaran, tetapi 
pertumbuhan Harga Domestik Kasar (KDNK) menunjukkan hubungan negatif 
dengan saiz tawaran. Kepentingan kajian ini boleh mengingatkan pengawalselia 
untuk meningkatkan kualiti institusi untuk mempromosikan pertumbuhan pasaran. 
 
 
Kata kunci: kualiti institusi, tawaran awam awal (TAA), saiz tawaran, Hong Kong, 
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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of Study 
 
The initial public offering (IPO) is generally defined as a financial activity that an 
enterprise sells (issues) its securities to the public for the first time in the primary 
market (Ritter, 1998). Normally, the type of security can be sold by debt or equity 
(Ritter, 1998). The initial public offering (IPO) has become the financing method 
pursued by most companies in the stock market. Going public is the positive chance 
of financing for young enterprises to grow up and also provide capital to raise 
additional funds for the older enterprises (Kim & Weisbach, 2005). Meanwhile, the 
initial public offering (IPO) is a popular way that investors trade and gain on the 
stock market. 
 
As an iconic market for capitalism known for its low taxes and free trade 
environment, Hong Kong has attracted interest from investors around the world. 
Hong Kong IPO market is obviously affected by the global economy due to the 
monetary policy in Hong Kong is called Linked Exchange Rate System (LERS). 
Under LERS regulation, before the Central Bank of Hong Kong print money, Hong 
Kong dollars per issue, a bank will pay the $0.128 to the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority in the Exchange Fund Accounts and get the Certificate of indebtedness. 
The amount of U.S dollars that the Exchange Fund’s paid supports the stability of 
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Hong Kong’ exchange rate (Zhang, 2002). In other words, the stability of the Hong 
Kong economic is highly influenced by the U.S market. Thus, this study assume that 
the economic condition may influence the size of offering as the volatile economic 
environment may tend to more uncertainty of investment for participants.  
 
The offer size is defined as the proportion of ownership of the company that shares 
to the public at IPO, as well as the amount of capital raised that the managers decide 
to use for growth (Badru et al 2017). Whether the success or failure of IPO depends 
on the reasonable offer size which can be measured by offer price multiplied by the 
number of IPOs (Drake & Vetsuypens, 1993). The company is willing to raise more 
capital at IPO based on the good level of confidence from the participants who 
participate in the stock market.  
 
There are several previous studies have discussed the determinants of offer size. The 
structure of the company is one of the determinants which influence the capital 
raised at IPO (Alavi et al., 2008; Latham & Braun, 2010). For instance, the 
ownership of the firm affect the amount of capital raised since it will affect the 
managers control the company for their private interest (Zingales, 1995), and the 
structure of board of directors (BODs) is seen as a factor affecting the IPO proceeds 
(Latham & Braun, 2010) since the effective structure of BODs increase the 
transparency and credibility as it promotes the confidence level. Besides, the timing 
of opportunity could affect the amount of capital raised (Deeds et al., 1996) through 
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the perspectives of investors (Mousa, 2014). Based on the signaling theory (Grinblatt 
& Hwang, 1989), the sales growth, leverage and quality of auditor are seen as a sign 
of valuation of ability of company affect the size of offering through increasing 
transparency and investors’ perspectives (Latham & Braun, 2010; Mayur & Kumar, 
2013; Badru et al., 2017). The cost of issuing is also an important factor influence 
the offer size of IPO based on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Chen & Wu, 
2002).    
 
Other than that, the level of governance was identified as a crucial role in the IPO 
process as it affects the stock market through reduce the uncertainty of market 
condition and attract more investors (Lester et al., 2006). The institutional quality 
was generally acted as a proxy for the standard of governance. Based on the previous 
study, the arguments come forward that the institutional quality could impact the IPO 
market (Ajmal 2018; Boulton et al., 2010; Asongu 2012; Hearn 2014; Hopp et al., 
2007; Satta et al., 2017). This study believes that institutional quality could influence 
the offer size of IPO as a country with a high level of governance would able to 
attract investors to subscribe for issuance of IPO. Hence, this study would examine 
six indicators that could influence the institutional quality involves voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory 





1.2 Hong Kong Stock Market 
 
The total market capitalization of Hong Kong listed companies up to USD 4,350 
billion (or around HKD 33,998 billion) since December 2017 and was ranked 4
th
 
compared to other stock markets. Mostly the market capitalization of Hong Kong 
market accounts for half of the Mainland of China market and it accounts for only 14% 
of the value of the United States market. Based on Figure 1.1, it is clear that the 
number of listed companies has been increasing in general from the year 2000 to the 
year 2017 in the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  
 
Regarding the statistics from the website of Hong Kong Stock Exchange by range of 
the year 2000 to the year 2017, the newly listed company in Main Board reached to 
the largest value (174) with percentage of total listed companies (8.22%) in 2010 
(including the listed companies who transfer from Growth Enterprises Market). 
However, the number of newly listed companies experienced two sudden declines 
between 2000 and 2017, which were reflected in Figure 1.1 in 2008 and 2012 
respectively. This is most likely due to the effects of the global financial crisis in 
2008 and the European debt crisis at the end of 2011. The turbulence of 
macroeconomics has increased the volatility of the Hong Kong stock market. This 
phenomenon reflects the environmental turbulence impact on the confidence levels 





Figure 1.1 Numbers and percentage of IPOs to the total number of listed companies 
in the Main Board of Hong Kong Stock Exchange  
 
Figure 1.2 shows that it reflects as sizes of an offering of IPO in a proportion of the 
value of the Hong Kong stock market between the year 2000 and the year 2017. The 
amount of raised capital at IPO also plummeted in the year 2008 and the year 2012. 
It reflects the fact that the environmental turbulent has not only reduced the 
confidence level of a company when the company goes public but also caused them 
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Figure 1.2 IPO size versus stock market capitalization 
 
Since 1993, under the rule of the Company Law, the size of new shares including the 
number of shares issued and the price of shares issued is usually confirmed by the 
securities authorities firstly, and it is being contributed by the government. Unlike 
the Mainland of China, Hong Kong IPO Offerings are classified as Hong Kong 
public offerings and international offerings. By contrast, international offerings, 
where investors can specify a price or place a limit order, have a decisive impact on 
the offer size of IPOs. In other words, the size of the offering is affected by the 
investors' perspectives of both market and company. As one factor that reflects the 
condition of the market, the institutional quality is also considered as an important 
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1.3 Problem Statement 
 
Offer size of IPO is measured by the number of IPOs issued multiplied by the offer 
price that is used to determine the proceeds that the company raises the capital for 
growth. However, it is not easy to raise fund by IPOs for companies. It is known that 
the failure of capital raised is affected by the inefficient size of the offering (Chen 
&Wu, 2002). Based on the previous study, many determinants have to be found that 
influence the capital raised through improve the transparency or reduce the 
uncertainty. For example, Preffer (1972) argued that the ineffective structure of 
board of directors (BODs) can affect the amount of capital raised since it increases 
the uncertainty of investment, and it could reduce the confidence level of issuers and 
investors in participating in the market. Further, poor institutional quality may 
increase the uncertainty of investment (Boulton et al., 2010). Therefore, the present 
study believes that the poor institutional quality and uncertainty may affect the 
decision to offer the new shares but yet to be tested. Hence, this study would 
examine six indicators that could influence institutional quality. 
 
Firstly, based on the study of Hooper et al. (2009), they tested the relationship 
between government effectiveness and the stock market and argued that a low level 
of government effectiveness is able to promote a lower cost of capital raised. The 
company may be willing to issue more with a lower cost of issuing. Besides, Hearn 
and Piesse (2012) illustrated the relationship between institutional quality and 
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control retention. They argued that good government effectiveness increases control 
retention and raise agency problem. Therefore, the present study argues that 
government effectiveness could affect the offer size since strong government 
effectiveness tends to a higher level of uncertainty due to the high agency cost. Thus, 
it makes the company difficult to raise capital. However, there is a lack of evidence 
of the relationship between government effectiveness and offer size. 
 
Secondly, as a basic role of governance in a country, the rule of law represents how 
participants confident on the rules of society, especially in the protection of right 
from the contracts. Similar as government effectiveness, the good quality of rule of 
law was mentioned to positively effects on the IPOs trading with a higher initial 
return (Ajmal, 2018; Asongu, 2012; Hopp et al., 2007). They argued that a good 
level of the rule of law improve the transparency and credibility of issuers and 
investors, and then the offer size would be assumed to be largely due to the 
protection from good governance improve the confidence level of participants. 
Hence, this study argues that a good level of rule of law reduce the uncertainty due 
to the transparency and credibility, and it makes the issuer easy to raise capital under 
a high confidence level of participants but yet to be tested.  
 
Thirdly, as a momentous proxy for institutional quality, control of corruption 
represents how the government use their public power to respond to public gains. 
Broadly speaking, Ajmal (2018) found the IPOs in the market who is under the less 
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control of corruption may produce more mispriced. In other words, he argued that a 
higher level of control of corruption promotes a higher level of transparency. This 
argument is supported by prior studies of Asongu (2012), Hearn (2014) and Christian 
and Axel (2007). They tested the relationship between institutional quality and 
underpricing in North Africa market, and argued that the quality of the rule of law 
improve transparency and attract international investors through strengthening 
institutional quality. Good quality of control of corruption improve the transparency 
and reduce the uncertainty which makes issuers easy to raise capital. Therefore, the 
present study argues that good control of corruption may have a positive impact on 
the offer size. 
 
Fourthly, political stability can normally provide a stable trading environment for 
both issuers and investors. Due to the study of Hopp et al. (2007), they argued that 
positive political stability tends to a high level of disclosure. Boulton et al. (2010) 
tested the institutional quality with underpricing of IPOs, and they consistently 
argued that a good quality of political stability could improve the transparency and 
reduce the uncertainty of investment. Therefore, the present study argues that 
political stability has a positive impact on the offer size. Good political stability 
reduces uncertainty through promoting transparency and credibility, and it that 
makes companies easier to raise capital. However, there are a few literatures to 





Fifthly, voice and accountability represent the basic human right that investors can 
trade freely in the stock market. Asongu (2012) believed that a good quality of voice 
and accountability can create a good market performance and provide a better choice 
for the small business enterprise who need a positive environment to grow up. He 
argued that a good quality of voice and accountability reduce the uncertainty by 
increasing transparency. Similarly, the study of Boulton et al. (2010) was also carried 
out a positive relationship between institutional quality and underpricing under the 
health market environment. They argued that the voice and accountability improve 
financial disclosure. Therefore, the present study argues that good voice and 
accountability can reduce uncertainty through improve the disclosure and attract 
more investors. It makes the issuers easier to raise capital. Thus, by measuring the 
relationship of voice and accountability with offer size, it is expected to supplement 
the literature. 
 
Finally, regulatory quality is also one of the governance indicators to proxy for 
institutional quality, and it defined as the ability that government to implement the 
regulations which are helpful to promote economic growth and break the cycle of 
poverty. Low et al. (2011) investigated how country-level governance affects the 
performance of the stock market, and they argued that a higher quality of regulatory 
would increase the cost of issuing. Hearn and Piesse (2012) argued that a good 
quality of regulatory quality could reduce the control retention of the manager. 
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Deeds et al. (1996) argued that the company under a high-level regulatory quality 
increase the uncertainty by reducing the time of an opportunity of capital raised. 
Therefore, the present study argues that there is the regulatory quality could have a 
negative impact on the offer size due to increasing cost of issuing and reduction of 
opportunity. However, there is a gap in how regulatory quality affects offer size of 
IPO. 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
 
The main objective of the study is to measure the indicators of six institutional 
quality variables (government effectiveness, rules of law, control of corruption, 
political stability, voice and accountability and regulatory quality) that affect the 
offer size of IPOs. To specifically, the six objectives of this study are identified as 
follows, 
 
1. To investigate the impact of government effectiveness on offer size of IPOs 
2. To test the impact of rules of law on offer size of IPOs 
3. To assess the impact of control of corruption on offer size of IPOs 
4. To examine the influence of political stability on offer size of IPOs 
5. To measure the effect of voice and accountability on offer size of IPOs 




1.5 Research Questions 
 
Through the background of prior study, there are six questions are identified as 
follows, 
1. Does government effectiveness impact on offer size of IPOs? 
2. Does rules of law impact on offer size of IPOs? 
3. Does control of corruption influence offer size of IPOs? 
4. Does political stability influence offer size of IPOs? 
5. Do voice and accountability affect offer size of IPOs? 
6. Does regulatory quality impact on offer size of IPOs?  
 
1.6 Significance and Contribution of the Study 
 
The biggest contribution of this study is to make up for the gap in the current 
research on IPO by testing whether institutional qualities (i.e., government 
effectiveness, rules of law, control of corruption, political stability, voice and 
accountability and regulatory quality) are important factors to be considered in IPO 






For the investors, regarding the significant relationship between offer size and 
institutional quality, it is meaningful to help investors to make better investment 
decisions and reduce the risk of loss. This is because a strong institutional quality 
reduces uncertainty and promote a high confidence level (Ajmal, 2018). By 
considering the choice of investment, investors can decide following the level of 
institutional quality. A good level of institutional quality would improve the 
confidence level of investors. Otherwise, an instable institutional environment 
signals poor protection of investors which would increase the risk of loss.  
 
1.6.2 Issuers 
For the contribution for the issuers, the evidence between offer size and institutional 
quality is able to issue full subscription by issuing an appropriate offer size based on 
the institutional quality. Based on the previous study, Hooper et al. (2009) point out 
that a good level of institutional quality affects the transaction cost of issuing. Since 
the issuers expect to use the effective method of issuing for maximizing the capital 
raised, good institutional quality would reduce the cost of capital raised with an 
appropriate offer size to enlarges the benefits of financing. Besides, good 
institutional quality would increase the potential investors’ perspectives and attract 
more investor participant in the market (Mousa, 2014). It would promote the full 





For regulators, they have to consider to further improve the institutional quality as it 
influences the growth of the country. Good institutional quality enhances the 
business regulation reforms which made it easier to start and operate a business, 
improved transparency, strengthened property rights, and helped streamline 
commercial dispute resolution and bankruptcy procedures (El Sayed, 2011). On the 
other hand, institutional quality could reduce transaction costs by reducing 
uncertainty and establishing a stable structure to facilitate interactions (Meyer, 2001). 
Thus, the present study may enlighten the regulators to improve the success of 
issuing by improving the institutional quality. 
 
1.6.4 Body of Literature Review 
The present study makes a significant contribution to the body of literature that 
explains the relationship of six indicators of institutional quality on offer size of IPO. 
Regarding the mostly study discuss the relationship between institutional quality and 
underpricing, there are two theories able to fill the gap of lack of evidence involve 
the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and signaling theory (Grinblatt & 
Hwang, 1989). The present study argues that a high level of institutional quality 
could improve the confidence level by reducing the agency cost, increase the 
transparency and protect the investors’ interests based on the agency theory 
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(Lombardo and Pagano, 2006; Fan et al., 2008; Hearn, 2014). In addition, this study 
also argues that the uncertainty can be reduced due to the good signals on the quality 
of auditors, sales growth and capital structure, and it promotes the confidence level 
of issuers and investors based on the signaling theory (Amayur & Kumar, 2013; 
Badru et al., 2017).  
 
1.7 Scope of The Study 
 
To explain offer size of IPOs, the present study aimed to discuss the factors of 
institutional quality such as government effectiveness, rules of law, control of 
corruption, political stability, voice and accountability and regulatory quality. 
Besides, there are three variables controlled in which have been explained to impacts 
on offer size from the previous study which are Gross Domestic Price, Stock Market 
Index and Interest rate. 
 
Based on the objectives of the study, the sample extraction of IPOs is measured from 
those offer size issued for listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, in which the 
period is used from January 2000 to December 2017. The newly listed IPOs are from 
the Main Market. The data of IPOs is collected from the website of the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange. The final samples of IPOs offer size was processed without those 




1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This study was designed in five chapters. Chapter one explains the background of 
the study, a background of the market, problem statement, research questions and 
objectives, scope of the study as well as contribution. Chapter two summarizes 
previous literature relate to the present area of study and particularly mentioned the 
views of offer size, underpricing of IPOs and six indicators of institutional quality. 
The subjective hypothesis of this study is dialectically discussed through the 
discussion of past findings. Chapter three discusses the process of hypothesis 
development under prior evidence from chapter two. It also includes the sample and 
data design, selection of independent variables and control variables which refer to 
the methodology of the previous study. Chapter four is going to explain the results 
based on the present study. In the end, chapter five discusses the conclusion, 
limitation and implication based on the result from chapter four, and suggests for 




CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
To review the relevant issues and to support the development process of hypothesis, 
this chapter is going to summarize the literature from previous findings in similarly 
study area. Firstly, this chapter starts from the discussion of offer size of IPOs and 
the explicable relationship between offer size and IPO initial return based on the 
different background of the market in developed countries, developing countries and 
finally on Hong Kong market. Besides, the following part discusses the six 
indicators of institutional quality which involve control of corruption, government 
effectiveness, rule of law, political stability, regulatory quality as well as voice and 
accountancy and proceed the development of hypotheses. 
 
2.2 Empirical Evidence of Offer size in Various Markets 
The section discusses the previous studies with the tests of offer size based on the 
different market which starts from a developed market, developing market and the 
last met the Hong Kong market. The later section discusses the factors which can 




2.2.1 Offer size of IPOs in the Developed Markets 
Regarding the previous researches, Boulton, Smart & Zutter (2010) have studied the 
numbers of IPOs of 29 countries and independent administrative regions which 
including developed market and developing the market from the year 2000 to the 
year 2004. The descriptive statistics show the U.S. market had the largest offer size 
of IPOs (767) from the year 2000 to the year 2004, followed by Japan (755), U.K 
(631) and Australia (403). Banerjee, Dai, and Shrestha (2010) rank the offer size of 
IPOs with a cross-countries basis in a larger range of period since the year 2000 until 
the year 2006, and they agreed that the U.S. is the largest markets which hold 1700 
IPOs compared to other developed countries. The study of Boulton et al. (2010) and 
Banerjee et al. (2010) argued that the offer size of IPOs in developed markets is 
estimated to be larger than that of developing markets by providing the better 
macroeconomic level, market conditions or institutional quality compared with the 
developing markets, and there are several determinants have been done on offer size 
from the previous studies. 
 
Alavi et al. (2008) found that pre-IPO ownership structure influences the allocation 
of new share offered in Australia market. It is well known that a company's public 
offering of its own shares also represents a change in ownership structure and a loss 
of control. Hence, the managers of a company require control retention of 
management before the company goes public (Alavi et al., 2008) that would result in 
the size of offering to the public. Based on the agency problem (Villalonga & Amit, 
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2006), the CEO ownership is also considered a determinant that impacts on the IPO 
proceed regarding that the large size of the offering may bring out a high risk of 
threatening private interests (Latham & Braun, 2010). Based on the resource 
dependency theory (Pfeffer, 1972), the influence of offer size by the structure of the 
board of directors is explained that the companies can maximize the capital funds 
through reducing the uncertainty of the environment. Besides, Latham and Braun 
(2010) argued that the level of debt in a firm’s capital structure influence the IPO 
proceeds since a firm has to consider the orginasional risk with a high level of 
leverage before their decision making of IPO.  
 
Furthermore, the level of debt (Ross, 1977) and entrepreneurial orientation (Mousa 
et al., 2014) are kinds of signals reflect the firm’s value that influences the investors’ 
prospection. Mousa et al. (2014) argued that the lower prospection of the firm by 
investors would influence the evaluation of the firms’ IPO in the U.S market, and it 
would negatively impact on the amount of capital raised. Another factor that 
influences the offer size of IPOs due to investors' excessive prospection is the "hot" 
market issue (Ritter, 1984). Deeds et al. (1996) examined the factors affects the 
amount of capital raised on biotechnology industry in the U.S., and they argued that 
the "hot" market provides the timing of opportunity for capital raised (Deeds et al., 
1996). They also found that the geographic position is a factor affect the amount of 
capital raised at IPO. Meanwhile, Krugman (1991) argued that a similar industry 
type of enterprise cluster can facilitate the ability of enterprises to harvest additional 
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resources and information, and hence the geographic position of a firm represents the 
ability of success.   
 
2.2.2 Offer size of IPOs in the Developing Markets 
As an important member of developing markets, the emerging market is the 
developing market with a gradually improved market economy, foster economic 
growth and greater market potential. A report by the U.S. Department of Commerce 
has listed China's independent administrative regions (including Hong Kong and 
Taiwan), Malaysia and other 19 countries as emerging markets in the year 1994. 
Robert et al. (2006) point out that the offer size of IPOs in emerging markets is large 
as well. This is because the expansion of investment options in emerging markets 
adapts to the diversified investment motivation, transaction motivation and interest 
needs of investors. However, the offer size of companies in emerging markets not 
only expect to be affected by the competitive advantages of an emerging market, but 
also some other determinants influence the offer size of IPO. 
 
In the Malaysia stock market, the structure of the board of directors (BODs) is 
determined to increase the capital raised by signaling an effective structure of the 
board of director to investors and attract potential investors under a good quality of 
firm value (Badru et al., 2017). Other than that, Badru et al. (2017) also point out 
that the proportion of women on the BODs can also affect the allocation of capital 
21 
 
raised at IPO. The participation of women on decision marking is seen as a sign of 
the good quality of corporate governance which may promote the ability of capital 
raised (Sanders & Boivie, 2004; Chaddad & Reuer, 2009). The proportion of women 
on boards is also set at 30 per cent under the rules of policy by the former Prime 
Minister of Malaysia in 2017. Moreover, Badru et al. (2017) argued that the quality 
of auditors affects the IPO process. In the India market, Mayur and Kumar (2013) 
argued that the leverage and sales growth would influence the capital raised at IPOs 
since the company with high leverage and high sales growth has limited methods to 
raised capital without goes publics (Huyghebaert & Hulle, 2006).  
 
2.2.3 Offer size of IPOs in the Hong Kong Market 
In the Hong Kong market, Chen and Wu (2002) argued that the size of capital raised 
by a company affected by the cost of issuing. Companies tend to choose an effective 
strategy of capital raised consist of initial public offering (IPO) and seasoned equity 
offering (SEO) depends on the cost of capital raising since the company has to 
consider that the way of raising funds by IPO would sell a large size of company 
shares with a high cost of issuing. The companies are willing to issue more with a 




2.3 Factors Impact on Offer size 
The factors affect the IPOs offer size is usually determined based on the 
macroeconomic conditions of the country in which the operation of the issuer is. 
Normally the offer size of IPOs in developed markets is estimated to be larger than 
that of developing markets by providing the better macroeconomic level, market 
conditions or institutional quality compared with the developing markets (Boulton et 
al.,2010) and Banerjee et al., 2010). Then the factors affect the offer size followed by 
the development of the industry in which the business of issuer is. The geographic 
position is determined as a factor influence offer size of IPOs under the 
biotechnology industry (Deeds, et al., 1996). In addition, the offer size of IPOs can 
be affected by the structure of board of directs, control retention of manager, CEOs 
stock ownership, leverage, timing of opportunity, top management team, quality of 
auditors as well as cost of capital raised (Preffer, 1972; Deeds et al., 1996; Chen & 
Wu, 2002; Alavi et al., 2008; Zimmerman, 2008; Latham & Braun, 2010; Mayur & 
Kumar, 2013; Mousa, 2014; Badru, et al., 2017) 
    
However, the present study argues that institutional quality also can influence the 
offer size of the IPO. The country with a high level of governance would be able to 
attract investors to subscribe to the offer size of IPO but yet to be tested. Therefore, 
In the next section, the present study will like to determine the factors of institutional 
quality on offer size.  
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2.3.1 Government Effectiveness on Offer Size 
Boulton et al. (2010) used government effectiveness as one of governance indicator 
to test whether the directly influence a level of governance on the IPOs underpricing 
in the U.S. market. They argued that the high level of government effectiveness is 
due to a high level of disclosure and credibility. Furthermore, In New Zealand, 
Ajmal (2018) found the government effectiveness has a negative relationship 
between IPO mispricing. He argued that good government effectiveness would 
reduce the uncertainty, which can be either supported by Shleifer& Vishny (1997). In 
North Africa, Hearn (2014) estimated the relationship between institutional quality 
and underpricing of IPO. He argued that a higher level of government effectiveness 
would increase transparency by reducing information asymmetry.   
 
Conversely, Hooper et al. (2009) also tested the relationship between governance and 
stock market performance. They argued the government effectiveness positively 
influence the cost of capital raised. Similarly, Low, Kew and Tee (2011) investigated 
the relationship between governance and the performance of the stock market, and 
they argued that a lower quality of government effectiveness would increase the cost 
of capital raised. Hearn and Piesse (2012) tested the relationship between 
institutional quality and control retention of entrepreneurial founders, and they 
argued that a company under a lower quality of government effectiveness would 





This study argues that good government effectiveness may increase the transparency 
of the country and reduce the uncertainty of investment. However, the good 
government effectiveness would increase the cost of capital raised and increase the 
control retention of a manager under the pre-IPO ownership structure since the 
amount of capital raised is seen as decreasing as well. Therefore, the present study 
argues that increases in government effectiveness could reduce the offer size. Thus, 
this study will contribute to the literature by examining the following hypothesis. 
The first hypothesis should be developed as follow: 
 
H1: Government effectiveness negatively impacts on the offer size of IPO  
 
2.3.2 Rules of Law on Offer Size 
The quality of the rule of law determines that issuers and investors can trade freely 
and be benefited on a safe and protected legal environment, as well as issuers may 
issue more due to the confidence of the legal market. In the developed and emerging 
market, Hopper, Sim and Uppal (2009) found that a good quality of rule of law can 
impact on the transaction costs which be expected to the opportunity of profitable 
projects. This is because of the reduction of transaction cost of a firm enlarges the 
benefits of projects. Fan et al. (2008) and Lombardo and Pagano (2006) argued that a 
high quality of rule of law can decrease the agency cost, and hence increase the 
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investors’ benefits and attract more investors. Hearn and Piesse (2012) argued that 
the transaction cost can be reduced by the high quality of auditors with a high level 
of rule of law and attract more potential investors at pre-IPO.  
 
Meanwhile, the rule of law includes the forcemeat of contracts which can improve 
the corporate governance quality, and then increases the benefits of shareholders 
(Hopper, Sim and Uppal, 2009), and Asongu (2012) also find that improve the 
quality of rule of law has a positive impact on the stock market return in the sample 
of African counties. This argument indicates that the good quality of the rule of law 
could increase the potential investors' perspectives (Mousa, 2014). Boulton et al. 
(2010) investigated the relationship between institutional quality and underpricing of 
IPO. They argued that a high level of rule of law promotes transparency and 
credibility for investors.  
 
Therefore, this study argues that uncertainty can be reduced by the transparency, 
credibility, the good quality of auditors, reduction of agency cost and transaction cost 
and investors’ perspectives promote the confidence level of issuers and investors in 
participating in the market. Based on the previous study, there is still short of 
empirical evidence on the relationship between government effectiveness and offer 
size of IPOs. Thus, the present study argues that increasing in rule of law could 
attract investors and influence the offer size of IPO. The second hypothesis is 




H2: Rule of law positively impacts on the offer size of IPO. 
 
2.3.3 Control of Corruption on Offer Size 
Boulton et al. (2010) used the control of corruption as an indicator for the 
institutional quality to measure the relationship with underpricing of IPO in U.S 
market. They argued that a good quality of control of corruption can increase 
financial disclosure and credibility. Consistent with what they arguments, Asongu 
(2012) point out that a good government quality in control of corruption provides 
good opportunities of raising capital for the small business enterprises (SMEs) and 
influence the confident level of these enterprises to participate in the stock market. 
Hopp and Dreher (2007) mentioned that occupation can undermine shareholders 
wealth in most developed and emerging market. In other words, they argued that the 
control of corruption can protect the shareholders' benefits and then reduce the 
uncertainty for the investors.  
 
Besides, Low et al. (2011) and Hooper et al. (2009) investigated the relationship 
between institutional quality and stock market return. They argued that the level of 
control of corruption would influence the cost of the fund raised. In New Zealand, 
Ajmal (2018) investigated the relationship between institutional quality and 
mispricing of IPO. He argued that a good quality of control of corruption reduce 
27 
 
uncertainty through increase the transparency. Hence (2014) tested the relationship 
between institutional quality and underpricing in North Africa market. He argued 
that the quality of the rule of law improve transparency and attract international 
investors through strengthening institutional quality.  
 
Therefore, this study argues that uncertainty can be reduced by the high quality of 
transparency, credibility, protection of investor benefits and environment of 
opportunity to grow, and it will promote the confidence of both issuers and investors 
to participate in the market. However, based on the previous evidence, there is a gap 
in the relationship between the control of corruption and offer size that yet to be 
examined. Hence, the present study argues that a higher control of corruption would 
impacts on the offer size, and it would fill the gap of literature with the following 
hypothesis. 
 
H3: Control of corruption positively impacts on the offer size of IPO. 
 
2.3.4 Political Stability on Offer Size  
Political stability was thought to be the factor of institutional quality that most 
affected stock market returns based on the highest negative regression in the 
developed and emerging market (Hooper et al., 2009). However, Hearn (2014) found 
that a higher quality of political stability does not tend to good feedback on 
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performance in North Africa stock market regarding a negative correlation with IPOs 
underpricing. He argued that the quality of political stability could not promote the 
certainty of investment, in which consistent with Ajmal (2018).  
 
Adversely, Hopp et al. (2007) argued that positive political stability tends to a high 
level of disclosure. In the U.S. market, Boulton et al. (2010) stated that a stronger 
quality of political stability tends to a greater underpricing of IPOs. They argued that 
political stability could improve transparency and credibility to reduce the 
uncertainty of investment. Low et al. (2011) did a further discussion about the 
influence of political stability on stock market return. They argued that a high quality 
of political stability improves the certainty of corporate governance to protect the 
shareholders' rights. Satta et al. (2017) investigated the relationship between 
aftermarket performance of IPOs and political stability, and they argued that a good 
level of political stability could help to increase the transparency and reduce the 
expenditure of investment. Ajmal (2018) tested how institutional quality affects the 
mispricing of the IPO. He argued that good political stability could reduce the 
uncertainty of investment. 
 
Therefore, this study argues that the uncertainty can be mitigated due to the 
transparency, protection of investors, and credibility, it will promote the confidence 
level for issuers and investors in participating in the market. However, there is a gap 
that the relationship between political stability and offer size is yet to be tested. 
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Hence, the present study argues that increasing political stability could positively 
influence the offer size of the IPO. The hypothesis is developed as follow: 
 
H4: Political stability positively impacts on the offer size of IPO. 
 
2.3.5 Voice and Accountability on Offer Size 
The Voice and accountability were supposed as an important factor of institutional 
quality and did positively influence the stock market return cross 48 developed and 
emerging markets (Low et al., 2011). Low et al. (2011) argued a level of voice and 
accountability would enhance the company-level of governance and effective 
decision making of managers. Based on the study of Hearn (2014), he argued that 
voice and accountability are not able to reduce the uncertainty since there is no 
relationship between voice and accountability and mispricing. 
 
Conversely, Hooper et al. (2009) found a positive relationship between voice and 
accountability and stock market return cross 50 countries. They argued that the 
uncertainty could be reduced by protecting the investors' rights under a high level of 
voice and accountability. Boulton et al. (2010) tested how the voice and 
accountability impacts on IPOs underpricing in U.S market controlling by IPO offer 
size. They argued that a good quality of voice and accountability promote a high 
level of disclosure. Asongu (2012) mentioned that the good quality of voice and 
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accountability provide a good opportunity of financing for those enterprises who are 
most vulnerable to a volatile political environment. Ajmal (2018) found that a good 
quality of voice and accountability would reduce the mispricing of IPOs. He argued 
that the uncertainty could be reduced by voice and accountability.  
 
Therefore, this study argues that uncertainty can be reduced due to the transparency, 
the good opportunity of financing and protection of investors' rights, and it will 
improve the confidence level for both issuers and investors to participate in the 
market.  However, it is a short of research on the explanation of the quality of voice 
and accountability on offer size of IPOs. Thus, the present study argues that a good 
level of voice and accountability would attract investors and impacts on the offer 
size of IPO. The hypothesis is developed as follow: 
 
H5: Voice and accountability positively impact on the offer size of IPO. 
 
2.3.6 Regulatory Quality on Offer Size 
The quality of regulation reflects an understanding of the government's ability to 
develop and implement sound policies and regulations that allow and facilitate the 
development of the private sector. Boulton et al. (2010) measured the relationship 
between institutional quality and underpricing of IPO in U.S market. They argued 
that the high level of regulatory quality pushes a high level of disclosure and 
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credibility. In North Africa, Hearn (2014) estimated the relationship between 
institutional quality and underpricing of IPO. He argued that a higher level of 
regulatory quality could increase transparency by reducing information asymmetry.  
 
Differentially, Low et al. (2011) investigated how country-level governance affects 
the performance of the stock market, and they argued that a higher quality of 
regulatory would increase the cost of issuing. Similarly, Hooper et al. (2009) also 
tested the relationship between institutional quality and stock market performance. 
They consistent with that the regulatory positively influence the cost of capital raised. 
Hearn and Piesse (2012) tested the relationship between institutional quality and 
control retention of entrepreneurial founders, and they argued that a company under 
a lower quality of regulation would reduce the control retention of entrepreneurial 
founders under the pre-IPO ownership structure. Deeds et al. (1996) argued that the 
company under a lower level regulatory quality should be easier to enter into the 
"hot" market.   
 
This study argues that the good regulatory would reduce the cost of capital raised 
and opportunity of gains on ―hot‖ market, and increase the control retention of the 
manager under the pre-IPO ownership structure due to the amount of capital raised is 
seen as decreasing as well. It will reduce the confidence level of both issuers in 
participating in the stock market. However, it is a short of literature directly explains 
the relationship between offer size and regulatory quality. Therefore, the present 
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study argues that increasing regulatory could reduce the offer size of IPOs, and it 
would contribute on the short of literature by testing the following hypothesis: 
 
H6: Regulatory quality negatively impacts on the offer size of IPOs. 
 
2.4 Theories Related to Literature 
Offer size is often tested as a proxy for supply in the process of capital raised. The 
relationship between offer size and institutional quality can be explained in terms of 
the agency theory that an agency problem exists under the conflict between 
managers and investors based on the information asymmetry during the process of 
IPO, while the signaling theory is used to further explain the factors affect offer size.  
 
2.4.1 Agency Theory 
The agency theory was first proposed by Jensen & Meckling (1976) discussed the 
conflicts between agents (managers) and principals (shareholders). Normally, the 
underlying agency problem is that the principals believe that their interests could be 
harmed due to the agents who hold a lower risk and more information could protect 
their owns interests. Therefore, a large amount of capital raised is seen as a high 




Based on the agency problem (Villalonga & Amit, 2006), the CEO ownership has 
been found to have impacts on the IPO proceed regarding that the large size of the 
offering may bring out a high risk of threatening private interests (Latham & Braun, 
2010). Since the issuers are willing to issue more with a high confidence level under 
good institutional quality, the agency cost could increase following the increase 
conflict of interests with large size of capital raised. Thus, this study argues that the 
offer size of IPOs could be considered as smaller regarding the agency problem 
could be magnified under the good institutional quality. 
 
2.4.2 Signaling Theory 
Signaling theory is often used to explain the information difference between two 
parties (Grinblatt & Hwang, 1989). The party that is thought to have more 
information can make better decisions and, on the other hand, may enjoy more 
benefits. Good institutional quality could be seen as a signal that the stable 
environment for the investing purpose. 
 
Under the study of Zimmerman (2008), the functional and educational background 
of the top management team as a good signal of firm value whereby impacts on the 
amount of capital raised. The results of the study argued that the higher functional 
and educational background of the top management team would positively impact on 
the offer size of IPOs. Boulton et al (2010) found that the good institutional could 
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improve the confidence level of investors and issuers by reducing the uncertainty. 
Therefore, they argued that institutional quality could have a signal to investors in 
making investment decision. Thus, this study argues that the firms with high level of 
institutional quality will provide better signal in reducing the risk and accordingly 
the firm might issue a high offer size.   
  
2.5 Control Variables 
To examine the institutional quality on offer size of IPOs, the two control variables 
have been tested with a significant level from the present stage of the study. There 
are interest rate and stock market index. Through the literature of relation between 
IPOs initial return and offer size that has been mentioned in the previous section, it is 
supposed that the control variable of GDP which found a significant level with IPOs 
initial return can also impact on IPOs offer size. The following section discusses how 
each of the control variables is relevant with offer size. 
 
2.5.1 Gross Domestic Price (GDP) Growth 
As a macroeconomic indicator, Gross Domestic Price (GDP) is straightforward to 
reflect the economic condition of a country and acts an important role in the 
development of the stock market. Erel et al. (2011) used GDP growth as a proxy for 
Gross Domestic Price (GDP) to estimate that GDP can impact on the amount of 
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capital raised at IPO. As a result, he found that Gross Domestic Price (GDP) has a 
negative relationship with the amount of capital raised.  
 
Ajmal (2018) tested the relationship between GDP and initial return of IPOs. He 
argued that a good GDP in a country promotes a higher initial return of IPO. Asongu 
(2012) investigated the relationship between stock market capitalization and 
institutional quality by controlling the variable of GDP growth. He argued that a 
country with a good GDP growth would enhance the perspectives and confidence 
level of both issuers and investors in participating in the stock market.  
 
2.5.2 Interest Rate 
The interest rate was defined as the appointed percentage that the lender asked to 
charge from the borrower based on the amount of borrowing (Felsenfeld, 1967). 
Ameer (2007) used to test the relationship between outstanding of new issue stocks 
and bonds in Malaysia market. He argued that the interest rate can affect the attitude 
of borrowing for both private and public.  
 
Based on the result of Granger-causality Tests, he found that interest rate impacts on 
the new equity issues. Ameer (2012) had given a further explanation of the 
relationship between the interest rate and issuance of IPOs. He found that interest 
rate positively impacts on the number of IPOs which means that a higher interest rate 
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would promote the firms expand the offer size of IPOs which in line with the view of 
Lim et al (2012) in China market.  
 
2.5.3 Stock Market Return 
Normally, the stock market index is used to represent a country’s stock market 
performance based on the domestic currency. Even Mustafa et al (2012) found that 
Turkey stock market index has no impact on IPOs initial returns, some scholars 
prefer to measure the relationship between IPOs underpricing and macroeconomics 
by testing the stock market index and support that there is a line between each other. 
Ameer (2007) found stock market index can influence the new equity issuance. 
Ameer (2012) further confirm that stock market index has positive impacts on the 
number of IPOs issuance. The arguments of Lim et al. (2012) supports the same 
finding from the measurement of the relationship between the numbers of IPOs and 
stock market index in China.   
 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
 
In the past study, offer size was regarded as an influential factor to estimate the IPOs 
performance. That evidence contributed to that issuers and investors could change 
the quantity of investment or directly influence their investment decisions by 




Although several studies have tested the institutional qualities on IPOs performance 
with the initial return, the findings have yielded mixed results. At the same times, 
there are also some literature explained the offer size impacts on IPOs performance, 
but directly empirical evidence between institutional quality and offer size of IPOs 




CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
Overall, the data, sample description, variables, frameworks, model, hypothesis and 
statistics tests are discussed based on the chapter 3 that used to investigate the 
relationship between institutional quality and offer size of IPOs in Hong Kong 
market. In detail, data and sample are used to describe the scope of the present study. 
Besides, chapter 3 determines the dependent variable (DV), independent variables 
(IVs) and control variables (CVs) to develop the hypothesis and research framework. 
Finally, the statistics test measures the objectives of the study which have already 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
3.2 Data 
The present study tested with secondary data which are extracted on those offer size 
of IPOs for listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from January 2000 to 
December 2017. The offer size of IPOs is collected by the newly listed companies in 
the Main Market. The other data such the six indicators of governance (government 
effectiveness, rules of law, control of corruption, political stability, voice and 
accountability and regulatory quality) and Gross Domestic Price, Stock Market 
Return and Interest Rate are collected from the websites of World Bank and Hong 
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Kong Stock Exchange. 
3.3 Sample Description 
The sample of the study is built up of the offer size of IPOs from the newly listed 
companies from January 2000 until December 2017. Considering that several 
companies that transformed from GEM to the Main Board have issued IPOs for the 
first time, the final sample removed those who transformed and focused on new 
listings on the Main Board. Therefore, the total number of final samples are 1042. 
The start date was chosen in 2000 to reduce the impact of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis on the results of the study as Hong Kong's stock market was significantly 
affected by the global economy. 
Listing Year Population Final Sample 
2000 736 41 
2001 756 31 
2002 812 15 
2003 852 39 
2004 888 46 
2005 934 54 
2006 970 53 
2007 1,048 78 
2008 1,087 27 
2009 1145 60 
2010 1244 86 
2011 1326 68 
2012 1,547 48 
2013 1,643 73 
2014 1,752 90 
2015 1,866 83 
2016 1,973 71 
2017 2,118 79 




3.4 Measurement of Variables 
3.4.1 Main Variable 
The dependent variable under the present study is offer size of IPOs (LN_SIZE) 
which is calculated by the number of IPOs issued multiplied by the offer price of 
IPOs, meanwhile, the offer size used to as the natural logarithm of offer size (Chia & 
Pedgett, 2005; Boulton et al., 2010; Low & Yong, 2011). The formula used to 
calculate the offer size of IPOs are identified as follow: 
𝐿𝑁_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 = 𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 × 𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑                       (3.1) 
 
3.4.2 Independent Variables 
To achieve the main objective of the present study which test the relationship 
between offer size and institutional quality, there are six governance indicators play a 
role as proxy for institutional quality consist of government effectiveness, rules of 
law, control of corruption, political stability, voice and accountability and regulatory 
quality (Hooper et al., 2009; Boulton et al., 2010; Low et al., 2011; Asongu, 2012; 
Hearn & Piesse, 2012) in Table 3.1. The measurement of independent variable 
utilizes the percentile rank. Percentile rank indicates the country's rank among all 
countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, 
and 100 to highest rank. Percentile ranks have been adjusted to correct for changes 












The government effectiveness (GE) was defined as a quality of services 
to society and citizens, the quality of the civil service and the level of 
independence from political pressure, the effective formulation and 
implementation of policies, and the high credibility of the government 
with respect to the system established. 
Rule of law 
(RL) 
The rule of law (RL) was determined as the extent to which agents 
voluntarily comply with social rules in terms of the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, police and courts, and the possibility of 




The control of corruption (CC) was defined as the protection of private 
property in the use of public power includes combating various forms of 
corruption, and controlling the encroachment of upper-class groups and 
individuals on the interests of the state. 
Political 
stability (PS) 
The political stability (PS) represented as the ability to perceive the 
possibility that a government will be destroyed or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated 




Voice and accountability (VA) represented a quality of protection for 
those citizens of a country that can participate in choosing their 




The regulatory quality (RQ) was defined as a quality that the ability of 
government builds up and put into effect of sound policies, and the 
private sector grows under the regulations that are supported and 
promoted by the government. 
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3.5 Control Variables 
There are 3 variables will be controlled to measure the relationship between offer 
size of IPOs and six indicators of institutional quality since the significance relates to 
the offer size of IPOs from the previous study. These variables consist of gross 
domestic price growth, interest rate and stock market return. 
 
3.5.1 Gross domestic price (GDP) growth 
Gross domestic price (GDP) growth is measured by the annual percentage growth 
rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Based on the previous 
study, the GDP growth (GDP_G) used to represent the fundamental of a 
macroeconomic condition for a country (Hopp, et al., 2007; Asongu 2012). The 
annual data of GDP growth was collected from the website of the World Bank since 
the year 2000 until the year 2017. 
 
3.5.2 Interest rate 
There are two resources of financing for companies to raise funds which involve 
debt and equity. Either the company can choose the way to collect fund from the 
public by being a listed company, or borrow money from financial institutions such 
as banks. The interest rate (INTEREST) is represented by the lending rate on 
account of the present study since the lending rate indicates the rate of borrowing. In 
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other words, the interest rate is used to reflects the information of macroeconomics 
for the participants of financial resources (Chen, 1986). Some theoretical study also 
used the interest rate as an indicator of macroeconomics such as Ameer (2012), 
Güntürkün, et al. (2012) and Lim, et al. (2012). 
 
3.5.3 Stock market return 
The stock market return was tested by using the stock market index in the domestic 
market (Rashid， 2007; Lim et al., 2012; Chen et al., 1986). Reference with the 
previous study, Hong Song Stock Market Index (LOG_HKI) is used as a proxy for 
stock market return in Hong Kong, and the data of Hong Song Index treated by 






3.6 Research Framework 
Figure 3.1 estimates the relationship between the independent variables and offer 
size qualified in the hypothesis. The investigation of the relationship between each 
























Figure 3.1 Conceptual framework of the relationship between institutional quality 
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3.7 Model Specification 
𝐿𝑁_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐿 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽5𝑉𝐴 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑄 + 𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺 +
𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝐾𝐼 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 + 𝜀                                                                        
(3.10) 
Where:  
α = The regression intercept, 
β = The regression coefficients of the respective predictor variables, 
LN_SIZE = The natural logarithm of offer size of IPOs 
GE = government effectiveness 
RL = rule of law 
CC = Control of corruption 
PS = Political stability 
VA = Voice and accountability 
RQ = Regulatory quality 
Control Variables: 
GDP_G = Growth rate of Gross domestic price 
LOG_HKI = The logarithm of Hong Kong stock market index  
INTEREST = Interest rate 





3.8 Econometric Estimation Issues 
Before doing the measurement and analysis of hypothesis, there are some issues 
should be considered such as normality, autocorrelation, multicollinearity and 
heteroscedasticity issues. Therefore, there are serious techniques used to correct the 
issues by using Eviews (Version 10.0) that will be explained in the next section. 
Other than that, at the beginning of the analysis of hypothesis, the descriptive 
statistics will be shown to explain the basic characteristics of data such as mean, 
median, minimum maximum and standard deviation. Skewness and kurtosis also be 
produced by the descriptive statistics which are used to indicate the symmetry and 
peakedness of a distribution. 
 
3.8.1 Data Normality Test 
The normality test used to estimate whether the data of the study is normal 
distribution by observing both the descriptive statistics and the histogram involves 
Jarque-Bera statistics. When the Jarque-Bera is not significant (less than 0.05), the 
data is not considered as the normal distribution.   
 
3.8.2 Correlation Coefficient Analysis 
The correlation coefficient is a statistical index reflecting the degree of closeness 
between two or more variables, including positive correlation and negative 
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correlation. In the present study, the correlation coefficient is imperative to identify 
the relationship between the offer size of IPO and six indicators of institutional 
quality (government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption, political 
stability, voice and accountability and regulatory quality). The range of correlation 
should be between +1 and -1. When the result shows a negative value, it indicates a 
negative correlation, vice versa. The degree of correlation can be divided into three 
levels, including strong (more than negative or positive 0.7), medium (more than 
negative or positive 0.31 to 0.69) and weak (less than negative or positive 0.3).  
 
3.8.3 Test of Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity represents a linear relation in a view of the condition of two or 
more variables under the regression model (Gunst, 1983). The characteristics of the 
multicollinearity issue occurred is the high correlation between two or more 
explanatory variables. Such problems may lead to distorting regression model 
estimation or difficulty in estimating accurately. 
 
Several techniques for measure the multicollinearity was discussed from the 
previous study by Mansfield and Helms (1982), Mason, Gunst and Webster (1975). 
Among the variance inflation factors (VIF), a signal of highly linear correlation with 
all variables was proposed to verify the multilinearity. To avoid multicollinearity 
issue, Miles (2014) suggested that the role of thumb of VIF should not exceed 10. 
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3.8.4 Autocorrelation Issues  
The existence of autocorrelation explains the correlation within variables based on 
different types of data, such as time series or cross-section (Gujarati, 2003). 
Following the previous study, Durbin Watson (DW) is used to estimate the 
autocorrelation. The statistics of Durbin Watson is identified equals to 2- 2ρ 
(correlation coefficient). Thereby, there is no autocorrelation when ρ equal to 0, the 
Durbin Watson equals to 2. If ρ equals to -1, the Durbin Watson equals to 4. It 
reflects a worse situation of negative autocorrelation occurs. For overcome 
autocorrelation issue, Newey-West covariance estimators are applied to adjust with 
the regression model. 
 
3.8.5 Heteroskedasticity Issues 
Heteroskedasticity issue happened when the influence of measurement errors (ε) and 
factors omitted from the model on the explained variables. If the regression is 
homoscedastic, the variances are indicated as same. Oppositely, the variances are 
different indicates the existence of heteroskedasticity. The issue of homoscedasticity 
can be overcome by the White test. The result is proved with a heteroskedasticity 
when the p-value is less than 0.05. In other words, the homoscedasticity problem 





3.8.6 RAMSEY Specification Test 
RAMSEY reset test is a way of measurement where the independent variables are 
useful to further explain the significance of dependent variables under a linear 
regression model. The result of RAMSEY reset test will be interpreted based on the 
F-test of the present study. It can be identified as no problem of misspecification if 
F-test shows insignificance. 
 
3.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter explain the research methodologies used for the present study which 
involves research design, data description and collection, research framework, 
techniques of interpretation of regression model and other specification model in 
order to determine the relationship between offer size and six indicators of 
institutional quality ( government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption, 
political stability, voice and accountability and regulatory quality). The software of 





CHAPTER FOUR FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction  
The beginning of the chapter discusses the results of descriptive statistics of the 
present study that explain the basic features of the variables involves dependent 
variable, independent variables and control variables. The correlation between offer 
size and six indicators of institutional quality under the control variables will be 
illustrated in the second step. After that, the issues of normality, multicollinearity, 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity will be estimated before computing the 
analysis of the regression model for the variables. Finally, the results of regression 
interpret whether the hypothesis of the present study is verified by the findings of the 
regression model. For a convenient purpose, the hypotheses are explained again as 
follows: 
 
H1: Government effectiveness negatively impacts on the offer size of IPO 
H2: Rule of law positively impacts on the offer size of IPO 
H3: Control of corruption positively impacts on the offer size of IPO. 
H4: Political stability positively impacts on the offer size of IPO 
H5: Voice and accountability positively impact on the offer size of IPO 




4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The results of descriptive statistics will explain the fundamental features of data 
consist of central tendency, dispersion and normality. Refer to Table 4.2, it states the 
result of mean, median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis 
and Jarque-Beta for all variables. Since the companies who transformed from the 
GEM to the Main Board market are eliminated from the data set, the total sample of 
the present study is 1042 during the period of 2000 to 2017. 
 
Based on Table 4.2, it shows that the average value of the natural log of offer size is 
18.7957 with the standard deviation of 1.5377. The maximum value of the natural 
log of offer size is 23.5792 and the minimum value is 14.1608. Offer size has a 
normal skewness (0.2407 close to 0) and a flatted curve with platykurtic (2.7977>3). 
Moreover, Comparing the listed companies’ offer size of IPOs during the period of 
2000 to 2017, the more size of offering exceeded the average value (18.7957) during 
the period of 2016 to 2017. It indicates that the more listed companies issued a larger 
size rather than other period during the year 2016 and 2017. 
 
For the independent variables, the indicator of voice and accountability (VA) has the 
highest percentile rank compared to other institutional quality indicators that the 
average value is 99.1955. The maximum of percentile rank is perfectly 100% which 
reflects that there is a high quality on voice and accountability. Based on the value of 
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skewness and kurtosis, it states that the voice and accountability has a left-tail 
skewness (-1.7024 < 0) and a peaked curve with a leptokurtic kurtosis (4.2724 > 3).  
 
The second highest indicator of institutional quality is government effectiveness 
(GE). The mean of government effectiveness during the period of 2000 to 2017 is 
95.1725 with the standard deviation of 3.2396. It indicates that the level of 
government effectiveness has a high percentile rank which closes to 100% in the 
Hong Kong Market. Based on the minimum percentile rank of 87.6923, the result 
verifies that the quality of government effectiveness is quite good in the Hong Kong 
market. Besides, the result of skewness and kurtosis shows that government 
effectiveness has a left-tail skewness (0.2407 > 0) and a flattened curve with a 
platykurtic kurtosis (2.9315 > 3).  
 
The mean of control of corruption (CC) from the period of 2000 to 2017 is 92.7503 
that has highly percentile rank in the Hong Kong Market with the standard deviation 
of 1.9836. The maximum of control of corruption is 95.1923 and the minimum value 
is 86.2944. This result points out the quality of control of corruption in the Hong 
Kong market between the period of 2000 and 2017. The control of corruption has a 
left-tail skewness and a flatted curve since the skewness (-2.2133) is less than 0 and 
the kurtosis (7.9324) is greater than 3.  
 
The average of percentile rank of the rule of law (RL) is 90.9319 with a standard 
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deviation of 4.6974. The maximum of rule of law is 95.1923 and the minimum is 
74.7526. Compare to the historical data during the period of 2000 to 2017 with the 
average of rule of law, it indicates that Hong Kong market has a higher quality of 
rule of law since the year 2014 according to the percentile rank of rule of law is 
higher than the mean value, but the quality of the rule of law is lower since the 
minimum percentile rank of the rule of law is lower than the government 
effectiveness and the control of corruption. Furthermore, the rule of law has left-tail 
skewness and a flatted curve since the skewness (-2.7144) is less than 0 and the 
kurtosis (9.8418) is greater than 3. 
 
Besides, the mean of political stability (PS) during the period of 2000 to 2017 is 
83.4899 with a standard deviation of 6.8325. The maximum value is 95.6311 and the 
minimum value is 72.3810. The larger difference between the maximum value and 
minimum value indicates that there is a relatively violent fluctuation of the quality of 
political stability during the period of 2000 to 2017 compare to other indicators of 
institutional quality. In addition, political stability has a normal skewness (0.0408 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The variable which is the smallest mean of percentile rank is regulatory quality (RQ) 
with 62.5883, and the standard deviation is 4.4350. The minimum of regulatory 
quality reflects a worse condition of institutional quality since the value is (51.7413) 
just half of 100%. The maximum of regulatory quality is lower than other indicators 
as well which is 69.9531. Based on the skewness and kurtosis, it indicates that the 
regulatory quality has a left-tail skewness (-0.7295 < 0) and a peaked curve (3.4275 > 
3). 
 
4.3 Correlation Analysis  
According to Table 4.3, the correlation matrix states the correlation between offer 
size and its explanatory variables. Based on Table 4.3, it shows that offer size 
(LN_SIZE) has two negative correlations with government effective (GE) (-0.0190) 
and regulatory quality (RQ) (-0.0455). The results of negative correlation reflect the 
size of offering on IPO would decrease when the level of government effectiveness 
and regulatory quality increase. The finding can be supported with prior studies of 
Ajmal (2018) and Hearn (2014) that the government effectiveness negatively affects 
the underpricing of IPOs. They argued that investors are influenced by the signaling 
of poor government effective since there is a stable environment of investment with 
a lower risk, and it tends to a lower confidence level of investors regarding a lower 
risk produces a lower return. Thus, investors are not willing to issuer more. 
Claessens and Laeven (2003) mentioned that higher regulatory quality comes out 
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with less uncertainty. It does not attract more investors who are willing to gain a 
higher return with a higher risk. Consequently, the supply of IPOs (offer size) may 
be reduced due to the decreased demand for investors. Furthermore, the independent 
variables including rule of law (RL) (0.0081), control of corruption (CC) (0.1563), 
political stability (PS) (0.2129) and voice and accountability (VA) (0.1470) have a 
positive correlation with offer size. It can be explained that the higher quality of rule 
of law, control of corruption, political stability and voice and accountability would 
result in a greater offer size of IPOs. This view can be supported under the signaling 
theory (Grinblatt & Hwang, 1989; Cohen & Dean, 2005) that quality of institutional 
quality plays a role as a signal to reflect a high premarket demand of investors and 



































































































































































































































































































































































































4.4 Results of Diagnostic Testing 
To ensure the validity of the model and the accuracy of the results, the diagnostic tests 
are required to report prior to regression analysis. The following part will discuss with 
normality, multicollinearity, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.  
 
4.4.1 Normality of Distribution  
Regarding Figure 4.2, the p-value of Jarque-Bera (0.0015 < 0.05) reflects an 
insignificant level of regression residual. It interprets that the regression residuals are 
not a normal distribution. Nevertheless, the non-normality can be ignored based on 
the large sample set of secondary data are able to run with valid and sufficient results 




















Std. Dev.   1.376979
Skewness   0.271315










Refer to Table 4.3, the correlation matrix states that the independent variables are 
highly correlated with each other (exceed 0.24) except the correlation between 
political stability and government effectiveness (0.1573) and political stability and 
rule of law (0.1867). The present study ensures the issue by using variance inflation 
factors (VIF) on account of the multicollinearity problem occurred when there is high 
correlation between variables.  
 
Miles (2014) suggested that the role of thumb of VIF should not exceed 10. Based on 
Appendix C of results of VIF, it shows that the valued of centered VIF for all of the 
variables are less than 10. It is considered as no multilinearity problem occurred. 
 
4.4.3 Autocorrelation  
To confirm the present study does not have autocorrelation problem, the statistics of 
Durbin Watson should be around two. Based on Appendix E, the Durbin- Watson is 
1.74 which reflects that the regression model exists autocorrelation issue. Therefore, 





4.4.4 Heteroskedasticity  
To measure the influence of measurement errors (ε) and factors omitted from the 
model on the explained variables, the F-statistics should be used to identify the 
heteroskedasticity issue. The heteroskedasticity was verified if the p-value of 
F-statistics is less than 0.05. Based on Appendix G, the results of ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression shows a heteroskedasticity issue (p-value < 0.05). Therefore, 
the White’s test is applied to overcome the heteroskedasticity problem by reducing the 
standard error of the regression result.  
 
4.4.5 RAMSEY Reset Test 
RAMSEY reset test is a way of measurement where the independent variables are 
useful to further explain the significance of dependent variables under a linear 
regression model. Regarding Appendix F, the result of F-statistics does not reflect a 
significant level (p-value > 0.05) which states that the analysis of the present study 
responds under a linear regression model.  
 
4.5 Results from Regression Analyses 
To achieve the objectives of the present study and test the hypothesis, the 
cross-sectional multiple regression is utilized to estimate the significance between 
offer size and its independent variables. Table 4.3 shows the Ordinary Least Square 
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(OLS) results for the relationship between offer size and its independent variables and 
control  
 
Table 4.3 OLS results for the relationship between offer size and its variables 









-35.24989 5.249176 -6.715319 
Government Effectiveness (GE) - -0.315853 0.037506 -8.421500*** 
Rule of Law (RL) + 0.078663 0.029851 2.635166*** 
Control of Corruption (CC) + 0.257416 0.034792 7.398744*** 
Political Stability (PS) + 0.025222 0.008838 2.853903*** 
Voice and Accountability (VA) + 0.281464 0.050117 5.616086*** 
Regulatory Quality (RQ) - -0.034422 0.014848 -2.318214** 
GDP growth (GDP_G)  -0.138127 0.025820 -5.349574*** 
Interest rate (INTEREST)  0.605421 0.086744 6.979418*** 
Stock market return (LOG_HKI)  5.199141 0.663444 7.836590*** 
Note: superscript *, ** or *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
 
variables. Refer to the F-statistics of the regression model, it indicates that the 
significance between offer size and its variables can be valid explain under a linear 
regression model. Therefore, the Equation (3.11) can be reported based on the 
Equation (3.10) as follow: 
 
𝑦 =    .       .       1 +  .       2 +  .       3 +  .       4 +
 .       5   .       6   .       7 +  .       8 +  .       9    (3.11) 
 
4.5.1 Results on Independent Variables 
The result which is summarized in Table 4.3 illustrates how the six indicators of 
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institutional quality (government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption, 
political stability, voice and accountability and regulatory quality) impact on the offer 
size (LN_SIZE). The hypothesis of the study (H1, H2, H3, H4, H5 and H6) also can 
be examined based on the result of the regression model. The following section will 
explain the findings and hypothesis separately. 
 
A. Government Effectiveness 
Government effectiveness is a governance indicator as a proxy for the institutional 
quality to test how the institutional quality impacts on offer size of IPOs in the Hong 
Kong market. In the light of Table 4.3, the result of ordinary least squares (OLS) 
states a negative coefficient (-0.315853) at 1% significant level. The first hypothesis 
of the present study (H1) can be accepted that government effectiveness negatively 
impacts on the offer size of IPOs.  
 
The negative relationship between government effectiveness and offer size on the 
results of this study accept the estimated argument of the present study that a good 
quality of government effectiveness would result in a smaller size of the offering. It is 
consistent with the arguments of Hearn and Piesse (2012) that the higher quality on 
government effectiveness promotes higher control retention of the entrepreneurial 
founder, and they would reduce the proportion of control shares to the public. The 
arguments of this study also can be explained based on the agency theory due to the 
conflict of managers’ interest when the companies were listed (Jensen & Meckling, 
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1976). This is because the agency problems raised when the managers are able to raise 
funds easily under good government effectiveness. In other words, the uncertainty of 
investors increases when the level of government effectiveness is good. Thus, the 
confidence level would reduce due to the increased uncertainty, and investors are not 
actively in the IPO market (Boulton et al, 2010). Furthermore, the negative 
relationship between government effectiveness and offer size is supported by the 
arguments of Hooper et al. (2009) that good government effectiveness promotes a 
high agency cost. Under the influence of higher cost and agency problem, a less 
confidence level occurred that companies are hard to raise capital and not willing to 
issue more.  
 
B. Rule of Law 
As an indicator of institutional quality, the rule of law plays a role as a proxy to 
examine with an offer size of IPOs. According to Table 4.3, it shows a positive 
relationship (0.078663) between rule of law and offer size at 1% significant level. 
Thus, the second hypothesis of the study (H2) can be accepted that the rule of law 
positively impacts on the offer size of IPOs.  
 
Similarly, referring with the views of the previous study, the finding of the present 
study is supported by the argument of Asongu (2012), in which a high quality of rule 
of law could increase the potential investors' perspectives. It would improve the 
confidence level of issuers and investors and attract more investors. Consist of the 
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findings of Boulton et al. (2010), he argued that good quality on the rule of law can 
attract more investors regarding it promotes more transparency and credibility. 
Hopper et al. (2009) mentioned that good quality on the rule of law improves the 
corporate governance quality which increases the benefits of shareholders. According 
to the transparency and increasing benefits of the shareholder from good government 
effectiveness attract investors to actively participate in the stock market, the issuers 
are more confidence in raising capital and be willing to issue more. 
 
C. Control of Corruption 
To examine the relationship between institutional quality and offer size, control of 
corruption acts as a proxy for institutional quality to fulfil the objectives of the present 
study. The result of Table 4.3 shows that the coefficient of control of corruption is 
positive (0.257416) at 1% significant level. It indicates that control of corruption has a 
positively significant relationship with offer size. Hence, the third hypothesis of the 
study (H3) can be accepted.  
 
Consistent with the argument of Asongu (2012), a good governance quality on control 
of corruption provides a good opportunity for enterprise, and thereby the confidence 
of companies should be raised and the offer size will be more. On the other hands, the 
confidence level of participating in the market is promoted by the effects of the 
reduction of transaction cost and increased transparency under the good quality of 
control of corruption (Hooper et al., 2009; Hence, 2014; Ajmal 2018). Companies are 
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easier to raise capital and be willing to issue more, and the investors are more active 
participant in the market with a good quality of control of corruption. 
D. Political Stability  
Political stability is used as a proxy to estimate how the institutional quality impacts 
on the offer size of IPOs. Based on Table 4.3, it shows that political stability has a 
positively coefficient (0.025222) which indicates that there is a positive relationship 
between political stability and offer size at 1% significant level. The result of 
significance from the regression model is consistent with the developed hypothesis 
(H4). Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is accepted that political stability positively 
impacts on the offer size of IPOs.  
 
It also can be explained by the study of Addoum and Kumar (2016) that that political 
tenses can result in the output of the financial market. Hopp et al. (2007) argued that 
positive political stability reduces uncertainty due to a higher level of disclosure. 
Consider to the positive relationship of uncertainty between political tenses and 
financial market, the increased pre-market demand can be explained that the reduction 
of uncertainty on the financial market would finally stimulate investors’ confidence 
level and participants (Yackson, 2008). In addition, based on the argument of Satta et 
al. (2017), the finding of this study can be supported that the uncertainty can be 
reduced by the good political stability due to the increased transparency and decreased 
the expenditure of investment, and it would increase the confidence level of issuers. 
Therefore, the issuers are easier to raised capital and are willing to issue more IPOs  
66 
 
E. Voice and Accountability 
As an indicator to represent institutional quality, the voice and accountability are used 
to verify how the institutional quality impacts on the offer size. According to Table 4.3, 
it shows a positively significant (0.281464) relationship between voice and 
accountability and offer size at 1% significant level. The hypothesis of the study (H5) 
can be accepted that voice and accountability positively impact on the offer size of 
IPOs.  
 
The finding of the present study is supported by several previous studies. Firstly, the 
high-quality voice and accountability improve the disclosure and credibility, which 
reduce the uncertainty and promote a higher level of confidence of both issuers and 
investors (Hooper et al., 2009; Boulton et al., 2010; Low et al., 2011). The investors 
who are confident to the issuers’ future prospects are more willing to buy and hold 
their shares under the market who has a good institutional quality (Che-Yahya, et al., 
2014). Secondly, Asongu (2012) mentioned that the good quality of voice and 
accountability provide a good opportunity of financing for those enterprises who are 
most vulnerable to a volatile political environment. Hence, the issuers are more 
confidence to raise capital and be willing to supply more. 
 
F. Regulatory Quality 
Regulatory quality plays a role as a proxy for institutional quality to test the 
relationship with offer size. Based on Table 4.3, the coefficient of regulatory quality is 
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-0.034422 under the 95% significant level. It can be explained that the hypothesis of 
the study (H6: regulatory quality negatively impacts on the offer size of IPOs) is 
accepted.  
 
The arguments of the previous study can further support the accepted hypothesis that 
the regulatory quality negatively impacts the offer size of IPOs. To consider an 
efficient method of issuing from the managers, the uncertainty could increase due to 
the increased cost of issuing (Hooper et al. 2009; Low et al., 2011). At the same times, 
the uncertainty could be increased due to the reduction of control retention of 
managers under a good regularity quality (Hearn & Piesse, 2012). Other than that, 
based on the signaling theory (Grinblatt & Hwang, 1989), a low level of regulatory 
quality is seen as a signal of opportunity that company is easier to enter into the ―hot‖ 
market and raised capital Deeds et al. (1996). Hence, the size of the offering of 
companies should be large with poor regulatory quality.  
 
4.5.2 Results on Control Variables 
There are three control variables consist of Gross Domestic Price growth (GDP_G), 
interest rate (INTEREST) and stock market return (LOG_HKI) utilize to do further 
identification of relationship with offer size of IPOs. On the basis of Table 4.3, there is 
a negative relationship between GDP growth and offer size at a 1% significant level. 
The result of the present study can be supported through the finding of Erel et al. 
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(2011) that they found a negative relationship between GDP growth and the amount 
of capital raised. At the same times, based on the agency theory, the uncertainty by the 
raised agency problem since the managers may promote their private interests and 
harm the investors' interest under a financial environment with good GDP growth 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, the confidence level would be harmed due to 
the increased agency problem and uncertainty, and it makes the issuers difficult to 
raise capital, and the investors are unconfident to participant in the market.  
 
Secondly, the results in Table 4.3 shows a positive relationship between the interest 
rate and offer size of IPOs at a 1% significant level. Since this study expressed 
interest rates in terms of lending rates, the result interprets that the companies prefer 
to raise capital by going public rather than borrowing in financial institutions when 
the lending rate rise. Ameer (2012) point out that interest rate has a positive impact on 
the number of IPO, and it argued that the increased interest rate promotes the 
confidence level of issuers to raise capital by equity offering. Thereby, issuers also 
reduce the number of IPOs to reduce the probability of failure. 
 
Thirdly, stock market return indicates a positive relationship with offer size at a 1% 
significant level. it interprets that the size of offering would be large when the 
confidence level of both issuers and investors is promoted due to the stock market 
shows a good performance. The finding of the study is consistent with the findings of 
Ameer (2012) and Lim et al. (2012) that the stock market index has a positive 
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relationship with the number of IPOs. In other words, the issuers are willing to issue 
more since the return of the stock market is high. Lim et al. (2012) supported the 
finding of the present study that there is a positive relationship between the stock 
market index and the number of IPO issuance in China market. 
 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
Overall, the percentile rank of voice and accountability (VA) shows the highest value 
of 99.1955 compare to other indicators of institutional quality in the descriptive 
statistics. Based on the analysis of the correlation between each variable, it shows that 
only government effectiveness (GE) and regulatory quality (RQ) have a negative 
correlation with offer size (LN_SIZE). Besides, from the regression analysis, the six 
hypotheses of the study have been accepted at a significant level which is summarized 
in the table below. The independent variables of government effectiveness (H1) and 
regulatory quality (H6) show the negative relationship with offer size, and rule of law 
(H2), control of corruption (H3), political stability (H4) and voice and accountability 




CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter determines the conclusion of the whole study. Before discussing the 
limitation of the study, the first section will present a summary of the study. Next 
section discusses the implication of this study concentrate on the factors affects the 
offer size in the IPO market. Finally, this chapter provides some suggestions based on 
the present study for future research. 
 
5.2 Summary of the Study 
This section presents a summary of the empirical findings of the present study. The 
main objective of the present study is to estimate how the institutional quality impacts 
on the offer size of IPO in the Hong Kong market. To achieve the main objective of 
the study, there are six indicators of governance represent the institutional quality 
consist of government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption, political 
stability, voice and accountability and regulatory quality. Besides, there are three 
control variables used to further explain the relationship between institutional quality 
and offer size which including Gross Domestic Price (GDP) growth, the interest of 
rate and stock market return. The sample of the study involves 1042 IPOs listed in the 
Main Board of Hong Kong Stock Exchange during the year 2000 to the year 2017. 
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Based on the empirical finding, the institutional quality has an influence on the offer 
size of IPO in Hong Kong. Among the results, government effectiveness and 
regulatory quality negatively impact on the offer size. This is supported by the 
argument of Hooper et al. (2009), Low et al. (2011) that the good quality of 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality reduce the confidence level of issuers 
due to the higher cost of capital raised and higher control of retention from the 
entrepreneurial founders. It is hard for the issuers to raise capital with the highly cost 
of issuing and the control retention of managers, and the managers may not be willing 
to decide a large size of offerings. Based on the underlying theory of Signaling 
Theory (Grinblatt & Hwang, 1989), a lower level of government effectiveness and 
regulatory quality are seen as a signal of opportunity to easily enter into ―hot‖ market 
and raise capital (Deeds et al. 1996). It can also be explained based on the Agency 
Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). There is an agency problem when investors 
believe managers are more concerned with their private interest with a large amount 
of capital raised under a condition of good institutional quality, and it could damage 
the interests of the shareholders.  
 
Besides, the present study found the rule of law, control of corruption, political 
stability and voice and accountability positively impact on the offer size of IPO. It can 
be supported by the arguments of Boulton et al. (2010), Hearn (2014), Satta et al. 
(2017) and Ajmal (2018) that the good level of the rule of law, control corruption, 
political stability and voice and accountability reduce the uncertainty due to the 
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transparency and credibility, and it tends to improve the confidence level of issuer and 
investors in participating in the market. Hearn and Piesse (2012) point out that 
institutional quality influences the offer size due to the negative relationship between 
the rule of law and transaction costs. Fan et al. (2008) and Lombardo and Pagano 
(2006) argued that high quality of the rule of law reduces the agency cost since the 
investors' trust managers highly concern on the shareholders’ wealth with high 
transparency. Asongu (2012) supported that a good quality of voice and accountability 
provides an opportunity of raising capital for issuers who should be protected from 
the unstable market environment. Hence, the issuers are willing to issue more, and 
both issuers and investors are optimistic to participant in the market.  
 
Furthermore, as one of the control variables, GDP growth was found negatively 
influence on the offer size, and it can be supported by the finding of the previous 
study that a negative relationship between GDP growth and the amount of capital 
raised (Erel et al., 2011). Based on the agency theory, the negative relationship 
between GDP growth and offer size can be explained by the increased uncertainty 
since investors believe that managers may promote their private interests and harm the 
investors' interest under a financial environment with good GDP growth (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Besides, interest rate and stock market return positively impacts on 
the offer size based on the empirical findings of the present study. It can be supported 
by the findings of Ameer (2012) and Lim et al. (2012) that the interest rate and stock 
market index have a positive relationship with the number of IPOs. 
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5.3 Limitation of the Study 
This study investigates the relationship between the institutional quality (government 
effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption, political stability, voice and 
accountability and regulatory quality) and the offer size of IPO in Hong Kong market. 
Before discussing the implication of the study, the limitation should be stated. The 
first limitation of this study is the incomplete sample size. The final sample of the 
present study is the IPOs listed in the Main Board and exclude the IPOs who listed in 
the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM). It is may not complete representing the 
condition of the Hong Kong market. At the same time, more observations of the 
sample would affect the result of the research more accurate.  
 
The second limitation of the study is the limited number of control variables. The 
present study is only controlled by the indicators of macroeconomics involves GDP 
growth, interest rate and stock market return. Based on Table 4.3, the adjusted 
R-squared is only 19% since the adjusted R-squared represent how the strength of the 
relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables. Thus, the 
R-square need to be improved by increase the number of control variables that may 





5.4 Implications of the Study 
The implications of this learning are explained with the investors, issuers and 
regulators based on the findings and principles of this study.   
 
Firstly, good institutional quality should be able to promote transparency and reduce 
the uncertainty to the investors, except for government effectiveness and regulatory 
quality. Based on the results of this study, the government effectiveness and 
regulatory quality with the high percentile rank of governance show a negative 
influence on the offer size Thus, it contributes that the investors can make a better 
investment decision through referring to the finding of the present study that the 
institutional quality influence the offer size of IPO.  
 
Secondly, the issuers can issue an appropriate offer size to achieve the full 
subscription by considering the significance between institutional quality and offer 
size. The good level of the institutional quality such as the rule of law reduces the 
uncertainty of investors by improving the transparency, and it tends to promote a 
confidence level of investors in participating in the market. Thus, it is easier for 
issuers to raise capital under a high level of investors’ confidence. On the other hand, 
the issuers are able to issue with an effective issuing method based on good 





Thirdly, the significance between institutional quality and offer size contributes that 
the regulators need to improve the institutional quality. This is because the good 
institutional quality such as control of corruption provides a good opportunity for the 
companies who need to be protected from the unstable investment environment access 
to raise capital. Besides, improving institutional quality is also promoting the growth 
of the country. 
 
5.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
Based on the limitation of the study, the section provides some suggestions for future 
research. Firstly, the present study suggests to include the numbers of IPOs who listed 
in the Growth Enterprises Market (GEM) to expand the sample size and complete the 
result of the study.  
 
Secondly, this study suggests increasing the number of control variables in order to 
increase the strength between the dependent variable and independent variables. 
Referring to the study of Guzmán et al. (2018), Signaling theory (Grinblatt & Hwang, 
1989) and life cycle hypothesis (Modigliani, 1957), the age of the company is seen as 
a good signal to evaluate the company for the investors, and it presents a choice of 
managers based on the different stage of their business life. The return on equity 
(ROE) is also considered as a control variable to represent the performance of the 
76 
 
company in future research (Guzmán et al., 2018). 
 
Thirdly, due to the target market of the present study is focus on the Hong Kong 
market simply, this study suggests to expand the size of target market for the future 
research, either select the market with the same level of economic criteria, such as 








Agarwal, S., Liu, C., & Rhee, S. G. (2008). Investor demand for IPOs and aftermarket 
performance: Evidence from the Hong Kong stock market. Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 18(2), 176-190. 
Ajmal, H. (2018). Examination of IPO Mispricing in Four Markets (Doctoral 
dissertation, The University of Waikato).  
Ameer, R. (2007). What moves the primary stock and bond markets? Influence of 
Macroeconomic factor on bond and equity issues in Malaysia and Korea.  
AAMJAF, 3 (1), 93-116. 
Asongu, S. A. (2012). Government quality determinants of stock market performance 
in African countries. Journal of African Business, 13(3), 183-199. 
Badru, B. O., Ahmad-Zaluki, N. A., & Wan-Hussin, W. N. (2017). Board 
characteristics and the amount of capital raised in the Malaysian IPO market. 
Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 42, 37-55. 
Banerjee, S., Dai, L., & Shrestha, K. (2011). Cross-country IPOs: what explains 
differences in underpricing?. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(5), 1289-1305. 
Baron, D. P. (1982). A model of the demand for investment banking advising and 
distribution services for new issues. The journal of finance, 37(4), 955-976. 
Boulton, T. J., Smart, S. B., & Zutter, C. J. (2010). IPO underpricing and international 
corporate governance. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(2), 206-222. 
Boulton, T. J., Smart, S. B., & Zutter, C. J. (2011). Earnings quality and international 
IPO underpricing. The Accounting Review, 86(2), 483-505.  
Boulton, T. J., Smart, S. B., & Zutter, C. J. (2014). The impact of institutional quality 
on initial public offerings. Journal of Economics and Business, 73, 65-96. 
Bradley, D. J., & Jordan, B. D. (2002). Partial adjustment to public information and 




Chaddad, F. R., & Reuer, J. J. (2009). Investment dynamics and financial constraints 
in IPO firms. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 3(1), 29-45. 
Chen, K. C., & Wu, L. (2002). Cost of Raising Capital--Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
and Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs)--In Hong Kong. Journal of Financial 
Management & Analysis, 15(2). 
Che-Yahya, N., Abdul-Rahim, R., & Yong, O. (2014). Influence of institutional 
investors' participation on flipping activity of Malaysian IPOs. Economic 
Systems, 38(4), 470-486. 
Chi, J., & Padgett, C. (2005). Short-run underpricing and its characteristics in Chinese 
initial public offering (IPO) markets. Research in International Business and 
Finance, 19(1), 71-93.  
Cohen, B. D., & Dean, T. J. (2005). Information asymmetry and investor valuation of 
IPOs: Top management team legitimacy as a capital market signal. Strategic 
Management Journal, 26(7), 683-690. 
Deeds, D. L., DeCarolis, D., & Coombs, J. (1996, August). THE IMPACT OF 
TIMING AND FIRM CAPABILITIES ON THE AMOUNT OF CAPITAL 
RAISED IN AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING: EVIDENCE FROM THE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY. In Academy of Management Proceedings (Vol. 
1996, No. 1, pp. 97-100). Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510: Academy of 
Management. 
Drake, P. D., & Vetsuypens, M. R. (1993). IPO underpricing and insurance against 
legal liability. Financial Management, 64-73. 
El Sayed, L. (2011). Determinants of FDI inflows to the MENA region: 
macroeconomic and institutional factors. In Finance and Economic Conference. 
Erel, I., Julio, B., Kim, W., & Weisbach, M. S. (2011). Macroeconomic conditions 
and capital raising. The Review of Financial Studies, 25(2), 341-376.  
Fan, J.P.H., Rui, O.M. & Zhao, M. (2008). Public governance and corporate finance: 




Felsenfeld, C. (1967). Consumer Interest Rates: A Public Learning Process. Bus. 
Law., 23, 931. 
Grinblatt, M., & Hwang, C. Y. (1989). Signalling and the pricing of new issues. The 
Journal of Finance, 44(2), 393-420. 
Gujarati, D. N., & Porter, D. C. (2003). Basic econometrics (ed.). New York: 
McGraw-HiII. 
Gunst, S. J. (1983). Contractile force of canine airway smooth muscle during cyclical 
length changes. Journal of Applied Physiology, 55(3), 759-769. 
Güntürkün, M. H., Gürarda, S., & Erdogan, H. H. (2012). Impact of Macroeconomic 
Factors on Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings before and after the Recent 
Global Financial Crisis: Evidence from Istanbul Stock Exchange. Journal of 
Applied Finance and Banking, 2(5), 261. 
Hearn B. (2013). The institutional determinants of IPO firm prospectus length in a 
developing context: A research note. Research in International Business and 
Finance, 27, 52-65.  
Hearn, B. (2014). The impact of institutions, ownership structure, business angels, 
venture capital and lead managers on IPO firm underpricing across North 
Africa. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 24, 19-42. 
Hearn, B., & Piesse, J. (2012). The influence of institutions in founder-CEO retention: 
IPO firms in a development country context. Academy of International Business. 
Hooper, V., Sim, A. B., & Uppal, A. (2009). Governance and stock market 
performance. Economic Systems, 33(2), 93-116. 
Hopp, C., & Dreher, A. (2013). Do differences in institutional and legal environments 
explain cross-country variations in IPO underpricing?. Applied Economics, 45(4), 
435-454. 
Huyghebaert, N., & Van Hulle, C. (2006). Structuring the IPO: Empirical evidence on 
the portions of primary and secondary shares. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 12(2), 296-320. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
80 
 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 
305-360. 
Kim, W., & Weisbach, M. (2005). Do firms go public to raise capital? (No. w11197). 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Krugman, P. R. (1991). Geography and trade. MIT press.  
Latham, S., & Braun, M. R. (2010). To IPO or not to IPO: Risks, uncertainty and the 
decision to go public. British Journal of Management, 21(3), 666-683. 
Lester, R. H., Certo, S. T., Dalton, C. M., Dalton, D. R., & Cannella Jr, A. A. (2006). 
Initial public offering investor valuations: An examination of top management 
team prestige and environmental uncertainty. Journal of Small Business 
Management, 44(1), 1-26. 
Li, L. (2018). The influence of government regulation on IPO 
underpricing. Technology and Investment, 9(02), 109.  
Lim, T. C., Lim, X. Y., Zhai, R., & Liu, Y. (2012). Do Macroeconomic Factors Affect 
IPO’s in China?. International Journal of Management Sciences and Business 
Research, 1(10). 
Lin, C. T., & Hsu, S. M. (2008). Determinants of the initial IPO performance: 
evidence from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Applied Financial Economics, 18(12), 
955-963.  
Lombardo, D., & Pagano, M. (2006). Legal determinants of the return on 
equity. Corporate and institutional transparency for economic growth in Europe, 
235-270. 
Low S. W. and Yong O. (2011). Explaining over-subscription in fixed-price IPOs 
—Evidence from the Malaysian stock market. Emerging Markets Review, 12(3), 
205-216.  
Low, S. W., Kew, S. R., & Tee, L. T. (2011). International evidence on the link 
between quality of governance and stock market performance. Global Economic 
Review, 40(3), 361-384. 
Mansfield, E. R., & Helms, B. P. (1982). Detecting multicollinearity. The American 
81 
 
Statistician, 36(3a), 158-160. 
Mayur, M., & Kumar, M. (2013). Determinants of going-public decision in an 
emerging market: evidence from India. Vikalpa, 38(1), 65-86. 
Meyer, K. E. (2001). Institutions, transaction costs, and entry mode choice in Eastern 
Europe. Journal of International Business Studies, 32(2), 357-367. 
Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., & Saldaña, J. (2014). Qualitative data analysis: A 
methods sourcebook. 3rd. 
Mousa, F. T., Wales, W. J., & Harper, S. R. (2015). When less is more: EO's influence 
upon funds raised by young technology firms at IPO. Journal of Business 
Research, 68(2), 306-313. 
Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The 
organization and its environment. Administrative Science Quarterly, 218-228. 
Ritter, J. R. (1984). The" hot issue" market of 1980. Journal of Business, 215-240. 
Ritter, J. R. (1998). Initial public offerings. Contemporary finance digest, 2(1), 5-30. 
Ross, S. A. (1977). The determination of financial structure: the incentive-signalling 
approach. The Bell Journal of Economics, 23-40. 
Sanders, W. G., & Boivie, S. (2004). Sorting things out: Valuation of new firms in 
uncertain markets. Strategic Management Journal, 25(2), 167-186. 
Satta, G., Notteboom, T., Parola, F., & Persico, L. (2017). Determinants of the 
long-term performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the port 
industry. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 103, 135-153. 
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The Journal 
of Finance, 52(2), 737–783. 
Song S. L., Tan J. S. and Yi Y. (2014). IPO initial returns in China: Underpricing or 
overvaluation?. China Journal of Accounting Research, 7(1), 31-49. 
Tian, L. (2011). Regulatory underpricing: Determinants of Chinese extreme IPO 
returns. Journal of Empirical Finance, 18(1), 78-90. 
82 
 
Zhang, Z. (2002). Real exchange rate behaviour under Hong Kong's Linked Exchange 
Rate System: an empirical investigation. International Journal of Theoretical 
and Applied Finance, 5(01), 55-78. 
Zhou Z. G. and Zhou J. (2010). Chinese IPO activity, pricing, and market cycles. 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 34 (4), 483 –503. 
Zingales, L. (1995). Insider ownership and the decision to go public. The Review of 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Variance Inflation Factors 
   
Sample: 1 1042 
   
Included observations: 1042 







GE 0.0014 6949.5670 8.0355 
RL 0.0009 4024.9130 9.2332 
CC 0.0012 5675.8040 2.5923 
PS 0.0001 298.6039 1.9846 
VA 0.0025 13467.1500 2.2168 
RQ 0.0002 472.8841 2.3603 
GDP_G 0.0007 8.5872 2.7319 
INTEREST 0.0075 136.0199 5.8067 
LOG_HKI 0.4402 4434.1550 3.2322 









Dependent Variable: LN_SIZE 
    
Sample: 1 1042 
    
Included observations: 1042 
    
White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors and covariance   
Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
GE -0.3159 0.0407 -7.7693 0.0000 
RL 0.0787 0.0322 2.4438 0.0147 
CC 0.2574 0.0347 7.4261 0.0000 
PS 0.0252 0.0087 2.9101 0.0037 
VA 0.2815 0.0514 5.4774 0.0000 
RQ -0.0344 0.0158 -2.1838 0.0292 
GDP_G -0.1381 0.0254 -5.4288 0.0000 
INTEREST 0.6054 0.0872 6.9439 0.0000 
LOG_HKI 5.1991 0.6680 7.7830 0.0000 
C -35.2499 5.2459 -6.7195 0.0000 
R-squared 0.1982 Mean dependent var 18.7957 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1912 S.D. dependent var 1.5377 
S.E. of regression 1.3830 Akaike info criterion 3.4959 
Sum squared resid 1973.8110 Schwarz criterion 3.5434 
Log likelihood -1811.3610 Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.5139 
F-statistic 28.3389 Durbin-Watson stat 1.7441 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 Wald F-statistic 30.3147 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0 









Dependent Variable: LN_SIZE 
    
Method: Least Squares 
    
Sample: 1 1042 
    
Included observations: 1042 
    
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 7.0000) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
GE -0.315853 0.063836 -4.947919 0.0000 
RL 0.078663 0.050203 1.566897 0.1174 
CC 0.257416 0.045246 5.689317 0.0000 
PS 0.025222 0.011372 2.217927 0.0268 
VA 0.281464 0.069784 4.033371 0.0001 
RQ -0.034422 0.023791 -1.446832 0.1482 
GDP_G -0.138127 0.033994 -4.063230 0.0001 
INTEREST 0.605421 0.116712 5.187307 0.0000 
LOG_HKI 5.199141 0.931763 5.579895 0.0000 
C -35.249890 6.588377 -5.350315 0.0000 
R-squared 0.198167 Mean dependent var 18.79572 
Adjusted R-squared 0.191174 S.D. dependent var 1.537748 
S.E. of regression 1.38297 Akaike info criterion 3.495895 
Sum squared resid 1973.811 Schwarz criterion 3.543389 
Log likelihood -1811.361 Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.51391 
F-statistic 28.33892 Durbin-Watson state 1.744123 
Prob (F-statistic) 0 Wald F-statistic 18.70704 
Prob (Wald F-statistic) 0 






RAMSEY RESET Test 
Ramsey RESET Test 
    
Equation: UNTITLED 
    
Specification: LN_SIZE GE RL CC PS VA RQ GDP_G INTEREST LOG_HKI C 
 
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values     
 
 
Value df Probability 
 
t-statistic 1.7731 1031 0.0765 
 
F-statistic 3.1438 (1, 1031) 0.0765 
 
Likelihood ratio 3.17254 1 0.0749 
 
F-test summary: 
    
 
Sum of Sq. df 
Mean 
Squares  
Test SSR 6.0005 1 6.0005 
 
Restricted SSR 1973.811 1032 1.912607 
 
Unrestricted SSR 1967.81 1031 1.908642 
 
Unrestricted Test Equation: 
    
Dependent Variable: LN_SIZE 
    
Method: Least Squares 
    
Sample: 1 1042 
    
Included observations: 1042         
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
GE -2.188214 1.056655 -2.070889 0.0386 
RL 0.548960 0.266913 2.056699 0.0400 
CC 1.781068 0.860025 2.070950 0.0386 
PS 0.174703 0.084766 2.060993 0.0396 
VA 1.932284 0.932389 2.072402 0.0385 
RQ -0.237160 0.115300 -2.056890 0.0399 
GDP_G -0.964128 0.466569 -2.066423 0.0390 
INTEREST 4.218767 2.039727 2.068299 0.0389 
LOG_HKI 36.126770 17.455420 2.069660 0.0387 
C -299.654300 149.213200 -2.008229 0.0449 
FITTED^2 -0.155534 0.087720 -1.773086 0.0765 
R-squared 0.200604 Mean dependent var 18.795720 
Adjusted R-squared 0.192851 S.D. dependent var 1.537748 
S.E. of regression 1.381536 Akaike info criterion 3.494770 
Sum squared resid 1967.810000 Schwarz criterion 3.547013 
Log likelihood -1809.775000 Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.514586 
F-statistic 25.872390 Durbin-Watson stat 1.746486 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 





OSL RESULTS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFER SIZE OF IPOS 
AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY 
 
Dependent Variable: LN_SIZE 
    
Method: Least Squares 
    
Sample: 1 1042 
    
Included observations: 1042         
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
GE -0.315853 0.037506 -8.421500 0.0000 
RL 0.078663 0.029851 2.635166 0.0085 
CC 0.257416 0.034792 7.398744 0.0000 
PS 0.025222 0.008838 2.853903 0.0044 
VA 0.281464 0.050117 5.616086 0.0000 
RQ -0.034422 0.014848 -2.318214 0.0206 
GDP_G -0.138127 0.025820 -5.349574 0.0000 
INTEREST 0.605421 0.086744 6.979418 0.0000 
LOG_HKI 5.199141 0.663444 7.836590 0.0000 
C -35.249890 5.249176 -6.715319 0.0000 
R-squared 0.198167 Mean dependent var 18.795720 
Adjusted R-squared 0.191174 S.D. dependent var 1.537748 
S.E. of regression 1.382970 Akaike info criterion 3.495895 
Sum squared resid 1973.811000 Schwarz criterion 3.543389 
Log likelihood -1811.361000 Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.513910 
F-statistic 28.338920 Durbin-Watson stat 1.744123 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
   
 
 
 
